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Abstract. Even though Article 23 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
explicitly acknowledges the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea to
nuclear vessels, many coastal states have recently forbidden or submitted to autho-
rization the passage of ships carrying radioactive materials: this reveals a trend towards
a more restrictive concept of “innocent passage.” As to straits used for international
navigation and archipelagic sea lanes, the ius communicationis is still prominent and
every measure that might prejudice the navigational rights of nuclear ships would
not be consistent with the Montego Bay Convention.
1. THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
OF NUCLEAR SHIPS: THE MONTEGO BAY RÉGIME
In the last decade, the number of vessels carrying dangerous radioactive
substances has considerably increased. There have been several shipments
of highly toxic materials (high level nuclear wastes, irradiated nuclear fuel
and plutonium1) from Japan to France and the United Kingdom for repro-
cessing and then being employed again in civil nuclear power plants once
back in the Far East.2 In their routes, these vessels hug the coast of states
which strongly protested and claimed the right to deny permission to enter
their national waters. The question is: do nuclear vessels enjoy the rights
of innocent, transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage?3 A stricter régime
of navigation might contribute to avoid disasters which hang right on the
head of the coastal states like a modern sword of Damocles and the out-
come of which is unpredictable and, unfortunately, often irreparable. The
answer to this question, which seems to be of capital importance, must be
found in the Montego Bay Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for
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1. Plutonium oxide, plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (‘MOX’), or vitrified high level nuclear
waste.
2. See The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, The United Nations Blue Books
Series, Vol. III, 187 et seq. (1995).
3. By “nuclear vessels” we mean nuclear propelled ships and vessels carrying radioactive mate-
rials, which are both taken into account by Art. 23 of the Montego Bay Convention.
signature in 1982 and entered into force in November 1994, taking also
into account the most recent practice in this field.
If the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea does not deal with
vessels carrying nuclear material,4 the Montego Bay Convention contains
two norms which specifically regulate their passage. According to Article
22, the coastal state may, where necessary having regard for the safety of
navigation, require nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or
other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials by sea to
use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or
prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships; nevertheless, under
no circumstances can this have the practical effect of denying or impairing
the right of innocent passage, or discriminate in form or in fact against
any ships.5 Article 23 explicitly acknowledges the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea to vessels carrying nuclear materials, providing
that they carry documents and observe special precautionary measures
established for such ships by international agreements (e.g., the 1972
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, the 1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, and
the 1974 Convention on Safety of Life at Sea).
But there is more. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone has been generally interpreted as establishing the impor-
tance of passive characteristics such as cargo, while the Montego Bay
Convention affirmed an “objective” concept of “innocence”: the coastal
state can refuse the passage if the foreign vessel carries out certain activ-
ities (partially listed in Article 19(2)) not strictly connected to naviga-
tion, which must occur in the territorial sea. Therefore, the question of
whether the passage is innocent is to be determined taking into account
the conduct of a particular vessel in transit and not on the basis of a sub-
jective judgment by the coastal state concerning the character of the vessel
or the presence on board of dangerous substances. Accordingly, a ship
carrying nuclear substances cannot be denied entry into the territorial
waters but may only be directed to take a safe route. This is confirmed by
the joint declaration issued by the United States and the Soviet Union on
23 September 1989, according to which “all ships, including warships,
regardless of cargo, armament or means of propulsion, enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with interna-
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4. The problem was not prominent at the time, since the first voyage of the US submarine
Nautilus (30 September 1954) is generally considered the beginning of nuclear navigation
(W. Bischof, Nuclear Ships, in R. Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Vol. 11, 240, at 241 (1982)).
5. Art. 24(1).
tional law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is
required.”6
In this author’s opinion, however, an obligation of previous notification
is fully compatible with the Montego Bay Convention. This obligation –
which can now be considered a general principle of international envi-
ronmental law7 – does not compromise the right of passage of the foreign
vessel, while the necessity of the previous authorization entitles the coastal
state to decide case by case whether this right exists or not.8 The notifi-
cation, far from challenging the navigation, wipes out the secrecy of the
passage and allows the coastal state to face possible risks for the envi-
ronment and the population, preparing adequate emergency plans and rec-
ommending the safest routes.9 The Montego Bay Convention itself requires
the contracting parties to adopt all necessary measures to minimize pol-
lution from vessels to the fullest possible extent:10 the notification can be
easily qualified as one of these measures. Moreover, Article 198 requires
a state which becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment
is in imminent danger of being damaged or has been damaged by pollu-
tion to notify immediately the other states it deems likely to be affected
and the competent international organizations. Interestingly, the Japanese
Government announced the route of the British cargo Pacific Swan, which
was carrying radioactive wastes, at the moment of its departure from the
French coast11 and the United Kingdom notified in advance to the Panama
Canal Commission the transit of the same vessel through that international
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6. 28 ILM 1444–1447 (1989). The declaration ended the diplomatic incident caused by the
ramming by Soviet naval units of two US vessels which entered the Russian territorial sea
off the Crimean coast (1988). See also the declaration issued by the Italian Government in
signing the Convention on the Law of the Sea (5 Law of the Sea Bulletin 39 (July 1985))
and the objection presented by The Netherlands against the declarations according to which
the passage of nuclear ships was submitted to the prior consent of the coastal state (R.S.
Lee & M. Hayashi (Eds.), New Directions in the Law of The Sea: Regional and National
Developments, Binder 2, VIII.1.b(3)).
7. This is the opinion of D.G. Partan, The “Duty to Inform” in International Environmental
Law, 5–6 Boston University International Law Journal 43 and 63 (1987–1988) and U.
Leanza, Il diritto degli spazi internazionali, Vol. II, at 370 (1999).
8. Nonetheless, according to Díez-Hochleitner, even the request for authorization would be
compatible with the Montego Bay Convention (J. Díez-Hochleitner, Régimen de navegación
de los buques de guerra extranjeros por el mar territorial español y de sus escalas en
puertos españoles, 38 Revista española de derecho internacional 554–559 (1986)).
9. Art. 22(2) of the Montego Bay Convention. In signing the Montego Bay Convention, Finland
and Sweden declared that prior notification of the entry of government ships into the ter-
ritorial sea was fully compatible with the Convention, because the request of information
does not deny or impair the passage. Nevertheless, the two states did not renew their dec-
larations at the ratification (24 Law of the Sea Bulletin 28, 36 (December 1993)). The
International Court of Justice acknowledged the existence of an obligation to inform the
concerned states of a dangerous situation in the famous Corfu Channel case (United
Kingdom v. Albania) (see the text of the Judgment (Merits) of 9 April 1949 in 1949 ICJ
Rep. 4–38).
10. Art. 194(3).
11. U.S. State Department PM Press Guidance, 14 January 1998, 4.
waterway (the environmental organization Greenpeace was thus able to
carry out protests during the passage).12
Some countries (United Arab Emirates,13 Yemen,14 Djibuti,15 Pakistan,16
Poland17 and Canada18) expressly require nuclear propelled vessels and
ships carrying dangerous and polluting substances to notify their passage,
while Ireland is steadily lobbying within International Maritime
Organisation (‘IMO’) for prior notification in the territorial sea.19 France
requires ships transiting through its territorial waters to report the nature
of their cargo before entering them.20 Moreover, there are many interna-
tional instruments, legally binding or not, that provide for an obligation
of prior notification, such as Principle 19 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development,21 the 1992 Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal,22 the 1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of
Hazardous Wastes within Africa,23 the 1990 International Atomic Energy
Agency (‘IAEA’) Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
254 The Navigational Rights of Nuclear Ships 15 LJIL (2002)
12. See http://www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear/transport/wasteshipment.html (6 February 1998).
13. Law no. 19/1993, Art. 5(4) (25 Law of the Sea Bulletin 95 (1994)).
14. Act no. 45/1977, Art. 8 (United Nations Legislative Series – National Legislation and
Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea 21, at 24 (1980)).
15. Law no. 52/AN/79, Art. 7, which can be found in R.W. Smith, Exclusive Economic Zone
Claims: An Analysis and Primary Documents 112 (1986).
16. Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Sec. 3(3), United Nations Legislative
Series – National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea 22, 85 at 86 (1980).
17. Act Concerning the Maritime Areas of the Polish Republic and the Marine Administration,
21 March 1991, Arts. 10 and 11.
18. Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, 27 June 1989.
19. E.J. Molenaar, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in a European Regional Context, in
D.R. Rothwell & S. Bateman (Eds.), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law
of the Sea 22, at 30 (2000). Several meetings in the IMO (particularly in the Sub-Committee
on Safety of Navigation of the Marine Safety Committee) have discussed the question of
prior notification, without the states being able to reach a common position on the issue
(see D.E.J. Currie & J.M. Van Dyke, The Shipment of Ultrahazardous Materials in
International Law, 8 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law
117–118 (1999)).
20. Decree no. 78-421 on Sea Pollution Caused by Shipping Incidents (24 March 1978), Art.
1.
21. Text in 3 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 835–838 (1992).
22. Art. 6 of the Basel Convention (28 ILM 657-686 (1989)). See, however, the Japanese inter-
pretative declaration presented at the moment of the ratification of the Basel Convention,
according to which the Convention does not require “notice to or consent of any State for
the mere passage of hazardous wastes on a vessel of a Party exercising its navigation rights
under international law” (text quoted by B. Kwiatkowska & A.H.A. Soons (Eds.),
Transboundary Movements and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes in International Law: Basic
Documents 32 (1993)). Similar declarations were issued by the Federal Republic of
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. 
23. Text in 30 ILM 773–799 (1991). Art. 6(4) of the Convention requires the ship to obtain
the written consent of the coastal state before transiting in its territorial waters. Art. 4(4),
however, preserves the rights of any state under international law connected with the
freedom of the seas. 
Movement of Radioactive Waste,24 the 1996 Izmir Protocol on the
Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,25 the Draft articles
on prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities adopted
by the International Law Commission in 2001.26 They all suggest that the
preservation of the (marine) environment is not subject to freedom of nav-
igation.
2. TOWARDS A MORE RESTRICTIVE CONCEPT OF INNOCENT
PASSAGE?
After the opening for signature of the Montego Bay Convention, the
increased number of nuclear ships and the greater ecological sensitivity
of the public opinion have contributed to the emergence of a stricter
practice. There are now many legislations which submit the passage of
nuclear ships to the previous consent of the coastal state. It is the case of
countries situated on the most important routes, like Oman,27 Iran,28
Egypt,29 Guinea,30 Malaysia,31 Malta,32 Spain,33 Peru,34 Saudi Arabia,35
Yemen:36 because of the great number of vessels transiting near their
coasts, they face the high risk of pollution deriving from accidents at sea.
Other states (e.g., the Philippines,37 Venezuela,38 Haiti, Fiji and several
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24. Clauses 3 and 5, text in 30 ILM 560–564 (1991). 
25. Art. 6(4) (text available from http://www.ban.org/Library/izmir.html).
26. Art. 8 (text available from http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/preventionfra.htm).
27. Declaration issued in ratifying the Montego Bay Convention (17 August 1989), in K.R.
Simmonds (Ed.), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Binder IV, U.5, 34.
28. Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman
Sea (1993), Sec. 9, 24 Law of the Sea Bulletin 10 (December 1993).
29. Declaration issued in ratifying the Montego Bay Convention (26 August 1983), in K.R.
Simmonds, supra note 27, Binder IV, U.5, 29.
30. Presidential Decree no. 336, 30 July 1980.
31. See the declaration presented by the Malaysian Government in ratifying the Montego Bay
Convention in Lee & Hayashi, supra note 6, Binder 1, II.1.b(4).
32. Act no. XXVIII of 1981 (UN Doc. LE 113 (3-3) (16 November 1981)). However, in the
declaration issued at the moment of the ratification of the Montego Bay Convention, autho-
rization is required only for the entry into internal waters and not also for the passage through
the territorial sea (25 Law of the Sea Bulletin 16 (June 1994)).
33. Law no. 25 of 29 April 1964, Art. 69 et seq. (United Nations Legislative Series – National
Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, at 45 (1974)). In 1969, France
adopted an analogous legislation, rejected in 1982 (Decree 69-690 of 19 June 1969,
abrogated by the Decree 82-5 of 5 January 1982: see 28 AFDI 900-901 (1982)).
34. Decree no. 027-77-EM, 16 November 1977.
35. Declaration issued at the moment of the ratification of the Montego Bay Convention (24
April 1996), in Lee & Hayashi, supra note 6, Binder 1, IV.1.b(3).
36. Declaration issued in signing the Montego Bay Convention, reiterated at the moment of
ratification (in Simmonds, supra note 27, Binder IV, U.5, 22–23).
37. Philippines Republic Act no. 6969 of 1990.
38. Art. 54 of Presidential Decree no. 2/211 on Norms on the Control of the Generation and
Management of Hazardous Wastes (23 April 1992).
Caribbean states39) go even further and forbid una tantum the transit of
vessels carrying dangerous materials through their waters. In other cases,
the prohibition of transit only covers particularly fragile or dangerous
areas, where the risk of accidents is higher.40
A régime of previous authorization is contained in most of the con-
ventions on nuclear ships, such as the 1962 Brussels Convention on the
Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, according to which nothing in
the Convention affects any right which a contracting party may have under
international law to deny access to its waters and harbours to nuclear ships
licensed by another contracting party, even when it has formally complied
with all the provisions of the Convention.41 The bilateral agreements
between Germany and the United States and each coastal state concerning
the nuclear propelled ships Otto Hahn and Savannah require the prior
authorization not only for the entry into ports or internal waters, but also
for the passage through the territorial sea.42
Interestingly, the ships carrying the Japanese plutonium have tried to
pass through the Exclusive Economic Zone (‘EEZ’) of several en route
states but, because of their protests, they had to give up and avoid them.43
Therefore, these ships have never attempted to claim a right of passage
through the territorial sea. Several Caribbean and Latin American states
forbade the entrance of the Pacific Pintail into their territorial waters, as
did Malaysia with respect to the Pacific Tail.44 Papua-New Guinea con-
sidered the plutonium sea shipments forbidden by the 1986 Treaty of
Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South
Pacific Ocean.45 More recently (July 1999), South Africa ordered two ships
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39. As far as Haiti is concerned, see the note verbale of 18 February 1988 by the Ministry of
the Interior, Decentralization, the General Police Force and the Civil Service, in 11 Law
of the Sea Bulletin 13 (July 1988).
40. It is the case of the waters (up to a distance of 50 nautical miles off the coast) which surround
the Galapagos Islands (IMO Doc. NAV. 34/3 of 21 May 1987).
41. Art. XVII (text in B. Rüster & B. Simma (Eds.), International Protection of the Environment
– Treaties and Related Documents, Vol. I, 405–421 (1975)).
42. Not always, however, is the reference to the territorial waters clear from the text of the
agreement (L. Lucchini & M. Vœlckel, Passage dans les eaux territoriales et séjour dans
les ports du navire à propulsion nucléaire, in Droit nucléaire et droit océanique 39, at 47
(1977)).
43. M. Roscini, La zone dénucléarisée du sud-est asiatique: questions de droit de la mer, 105
RGDIP 628–633 (2001). The Akatsuki Maru, the first plutonium ship ever (1992), care-
fully avoided transiting through the territorial sea and the EEZ of the coastal states (with
the only exception of French Polynesia) during its voyage from France to Japan.
44. According to the Malaysian Ministry of the environment,
as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and under its Atomic Energy Licensing
Act, Malaysia had the legal right to control the movement of nuclear material within its
national jurisdiction
(Malaysia Bans Ship Carrying Nuclear Waste to Japan, Reuter News Service, 15 January
1997, http://www.nci.org/c/cs-malay.htm).
45. Shipment of Vitrified High Level Nuclear Waste Must Respect Concerns of Forum Islands
Countries, Press Release, 24 January 1997, at http://www.nci.org/c/cs-png.htm.
carrying a great amount of MOX to Japan not to enter its territorial sea46
and, in January 2001, an Argentine court ordered the Government to
prevent a British ship (the Pacific Swan) carrying an 80-ton cargo of highly
radioactive spent nuclear fuel to Japan from entering waters under its
control, arguing it would put the country’s shoreline at risk from a toxic
spill.47 Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII
of the Montego Bay Convention, on 9 November 2001, Ireland started
legal action in front of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
in order to have the British Government suspend its decision to let the
MOX plant at Sellafield begin work, because of the risks involved in the
transport of radioactive material to and from the plant.48 On 3 December
2001, the Tribunal rejected Ireland’s request, but only because, inter alia,
the provisional measure was not urgent: the United Kingdom, in fact, had
stated that there would be no movements of MOX fuel to or from the plant
until summer 2002.49
This stricter practice has caused a “modernization” of the concept of
innocent passage because “la mer territoriale dont l’intérêt économique
diminue devient moins une zone d’exploitation économique qu’une zone
de défense et de sécurité.”50 According to the Montego Bay Convention,
the coastal state shall tolerate the passage of the foreign ship in its terri-
torial sea providing that it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal state and take place in conformity with this
Convention and with other rules of international law.51 A modern concept
of “security” should have not only a political-military meaning, but also
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46. UK Nuclear Fuel Ships Asked to Stay Out of South Africa’s Waters, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Report by the South African news agency, 26 July 1999, at http://www.nci.org/
k-m/moxbox.htm.
47. Court Blocks Nuclear Ship from Argentine Waters, Reuter News Service, 11 January 2001,
at http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2001/01/01112001/reu_nukeship_41289.asp (Art.
41 of the Argentine Constitution forbids the presence of radioactive waste into the country).
48. According to the Irish request, the UK should not allow any movement of radioactive
materials or wastes connected to the operation of the Sellafield plant into or out of the waters
over which it has sovereignty or exercises sovereign rights. Two environmental groups
(Friends of Earth and Greenpeace) have also started legal action against the UK Government
in the High Court in London. The two groups claimed, inter alia, that the plant would
increase the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons (A. Kirby, Nuclear Plant Faces
Legal Challenge, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1641000/1641543.stm).
49. See the Judgment at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. According to the Separate Opinion
of Judge Mensah,
a finding by the Tribunal that the evidence before it does not convince it that irreparable
prejudice of rights or harm might occur before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal
does not in any way imply that the Tribunal is saying or even suggesting that such
prejudice or harm might not occur at any time during the pendency of the dispute. It
certainly does not mean that the Tribunal has found that such damage will not occur (at
4).
50. “The territorial sea has lost much of its economical importance and it is gradually turning
from a zone of resource exploitation into a security or defence zone,” Lucchini & Vœlckel,
supra note 42, at 45.
51. Art. 19(1).
an ecological one: the environment, in fact, is a fundamental aspect of
territorial sovereignty and its protection is a basic feature of national self-
defence. The risk of pollution in a sensitive marine area of a coastal state
economically dependent on fishing industry or on tourism can be as serious
as the threat of an aggression to its territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence.52 It is not surprising, therefore, that several states officially
consider the protection of their natural environment as an integral part of
national security and perceive the passage of a nuclear ship close to their
shore as a threat to it. A régime of previous authorization would thus allow
the coastal authorities to assess the specific circumstances of the passage:
if there are no considerable risks, it should be authorized, while if a nuclear
ship intends to sail through particularly fragile ecosystems or waterways
where navigation is highly dangerous, the denial of the passage cannot be
considered illicit, especially if there are routes of similar convenience.53
It is worth remembering that, in a joint communiqué of 21 December 2000,
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay pleaded the vulnerability of the antarctic
and subantarctic ecosystems and the adverseness of the physical and mete-
orological conditions (strong currents, presence of icebergs) to oppose
the transit of a ship carrying nuclear wastes through Cape Horn.54 It should
also be noted that, according to Article 19(2) of the Montego Bay Conven-
tion, among the activities which constitute non-innocent passage is “any
act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention.”55 One
could object that the discharge of radioactive substances caused by an
accident at sea can hardly be considered “wilful”: in most cases, this
happens because of unforeseen and unforeseeable events such as bad
weather conditions. Pollution, in fact, unlike the other activities listed in
Article 19(2), can occur without any element of intent.56 In this author’s
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52. See the declaration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic,
in occasion of the passage of the plutonium loaded ship Pacific Swan through the Caribbean
Sea:
The Dominican Republic depends in a large part on tourism, tourism to our sunny
beaches. The quality of the water of our coasts is of vital importance for the develop-
ment sector, and any damage, even unintentional, of radioactive material could cause a
significant disruption of this important national economic sector
(Dominican Republic, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Press Release, 2 January 1998).
Indonesia and Malaysia had already declared that the passage of supertankers cannot be
considered innocent, because the peace, good order and security of the coastal states is
threatened by the environmental risks that those ships imply (A.M. Rieman, Creating a
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty That is True to Its Name: The Nuclear Free Zone Concept and
a Model Treaty, 18 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 236 (1990)).
53. This assessment is proposed by G. Badiali, La tutela internazionale dell’ambiente 101
(1995), and G. Cataldi, Il passaggio delle navi straniere nel mare territoriale, at 107–108
(1990).
54. Read the communiqué at http://www.nci.org/3img/abcu-span-1221.gif. The three govern-
ments stated, inter alia, that the Montego Bay Convention recognizes the right of the coastal
state to protect and to preserve the marine environment and its EEZ.
55. Art. 19(2)(h).
56. J. Van Dyke, Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium Under International Law, 24 Ocean
Development and International Law 399, at 408 (1993) (with respect to Art. 19(2)(h)).
opinion, however, the wilfulness must be understood in a different sense
and referred not to the consequence of the conduct, but to the conduct
itself. Therefore, the conscious passage of a ship carrying ultra-hazardous
materials not far from the coast, in a stretch of sea where navigation is
particularly dangerous, cannot be considered “innocent,” because the high
risk of an accident is not taken into account by the vessel.57
3. THE TRANSIT PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS USED FOR
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION
The transit passage régime applies only to straits used for international
navigation between two parts of high sea or EEZ.58 All other straits (i.e.,
the so called “dead end straits,” which connect a part of the high seas or
an EEZ with the territorial sea of a coastal state, and those straits formed
by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland, where there
is seaward of the island a route through the high seas or EEZ of similar
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteris-
tics59) are submitted to the innocent passage régime, Articles 22 and 23
included, but with an important difference with respect to the territorial
sea: the bordering state cannot suspend the passage (Article 45).60
In straits used for international navigation, the contrast between the
ius communicationis and the right of the coastal state to protect its own
security is even more evident than in the territorial sea. The risks that the
former jeopardizes the latter are in fact higher: suffice it to remind the
denseness of the maritime traffic which crosses the most important straits,
the proximity of the passage to the coast and the difficulties of naviga-
tion because of shoals and rocks (as in the Torres Strait between Australia
and Papua-New Guinea, where navigation is confined in a narrow sea lane
and pilotage is strongly recommended). The transit can therefore obstruct
other uses of that stretch of sea by the coastal state, e.g., for fishing
purposes, and facilitate potential attacks or interferences by foreign ships.
Nonetheless, it can be upheld that in straits used for international nav-
igation the ius communicationis is still prominent, at least when there are
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57. R. Albano, Accès des navires à propulsion nucléaire dans les eaux territoriales et dans les
ports étrangers, 9 Nuclear Law Bulletin 58 (April 1972); U. Leanza, La sicurezza delle navi
nucleari e la Convenzione di Londra sulla salvaguardia della vita umana in mare, 1
Annuario di diritto internazionale 168 (1965); Lucchini & Vœlckel, supra note 42, at 45.
58. Art. 37 of the Montego Bay Convention. The transit régime applies to the whole strait,
included the territorial waters of the coastal states (Lucchini & Vœlckel, supra note 42, at
407).
59. Arts. 38(1) and 45 of the Montego Bay Convention.
60. Moreover, Art. 35(c) excludes from the transit régime those straits in which passage is
regulated in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifi-
cally relating to such straits. In these cases, the problem of the navigational rights of nuclear
ships must be solved according to each competent convention.
no routes of similar convenience. The free transit through the so called
“choke points,” in fact, is a fundamental interest of the international com-
munity as a whole, not only of the maritime powers.61 The Montego Bay
Convention itself suggests this conclusion: nuclear ships enjoy the right
of transit passage as any other vessel, since the phrase “all ships” leaves
no room for doubt. Besides, the transit passage through straits used for
international navigation cannot be suspended for any purpose, including
military exercises, and even the innocent passage through the straits indi-
cated in Article 38(1) and Article 45 cannot be impeded by the coastal
state.62 Besides, in the transit régime, there is no norm affirming the right
of the riparian state to prevent a non-innocent passage.63 The state bor-
dering the strait may only designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic sepa-
ration schemes for navigation whether it is necessary to promote the safe
passage of ships, and it may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit
passage through straits, in respect of the safety of navigation and the
regulation of maritime traffic, the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution, the prevention of fishing, and the loading or unloading of any
commodity, currency or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of states bordering straits:
however, these laws and regulations shall not discriminate among foreign
ships or have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the
right of transit passage.64 These rules seem to be the consequence of the
obsessive concern of the international community to grant and to reaffirm
free passage through the straits which are essential for international nav-
igation and to limit the jurisdiction of the coastal states.65 Interestingly,
during the third Conference on the Law of the Sea the Japanese Govern-
ment, in spite of the adoption of the well-known “three non-nuclear prin-
ciples” policy, supported the transit régime through international straits
instead of that of innocent passage: it goes without saying that its maritime
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61. According to US President Lyndon B. Johnson, “[t]he right of free, innocent passage of
the international waterways is a vital interest of the entire international community” (quoted
in C.F. Salans, Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran: Troubled Waters, in J.N. Moore (Ed.),
The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Readings and Documents 185, at 195 (1977).
62. Art. 44.
63. The straits régime is thought to be closer to the high seas than to the territorial sea (W.
Riphagen, La navigation dans le nouveau droit international de la mer, 84 RGDIP 167
(1980)). The opposite opinion is however sustained by W.M. Reisman, The Regime of Straits
and National Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AJIL 70 (1980).
64. Arts. 41-42 (see T. Treves, La navigation, in R.-J. Dupuy & D. Vignes (Eds.), Traité du
nouveau droit de la mer 800–802 (1985)).
65. According to Molenaar,
[t]here are […] indications of a growing acceptance of a coastal State right of prior
notification for ships carrying hazardous cargoes in lateral passage through the territo-
rial sea, but not beyond or in straits used for international navigation
(Molenaar, supra note 19, at 44).
interests were considered prominent.66 The question of the applicability
of its anti-nuclear policy to some international straits because of the expan-
sion of the breadth of the territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles was
set aside by the Government.67 The United States and the Soviet Union
strongly reacted to the joint declaration of Malaysia and Indonesia of
November 1971, which refused to consider the Malacca Straits an inter-
national waterway and applied to them the innocent passage régime.68 In
September 1988, Indonesia closed temporarily the Lombok and Sonda
Straits for naval exercises with a unilateral decision which raised vigorous
protests from Australia, the United States, West Germany and the United
Kingdom.69 The United States and the European Union strongly protested
against the Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in
the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea (1993), which required prior autho-
rization for passage through the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz by
nuclear-powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear substances.70 More-
over, according to the United States, the Yemen Arab Republic “may not
legally condition the exercise of the right of transit passage through or
over an international strait, such as Bab-el-Mandeb, upon obtaining prior
permission,” because “[t]ransit passage is a right that may be exercised
by ships of all nations regardless of type or means of propulsion, as well
as aircraft, both state and civil.”71 There are only two contrary cases: the
Akatsuki Maru, which transported the Japanese plutonium, avoided the
Marco Roscini 261
66. See the declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Japan is participating in this conference [on the law of the sea] based on the basic position
that navigation in the international straits should be ensured as free as possible, con-
sidering that Japan is one of the largest in maritime shipping among the countries of
the world and that Japanese economy depends heavily upon international trade for the
survival of the country
(quoted in 27 The Japanese Annual of International Law 100–101 (1984)).
67. S. Yanai & K. Asomura, Japan and the Emerging Law of the Sea, 21 The Japanese Annual
of International Law 61 (1977).
68. The text of the declaration is in 77 RGDIP 271–274 (1973); see also K. Kantaatmadja,
Various Problems and Arrangements in the Malacca Straits (an Indonesian Perspective),
in J.M. Van Dyke, L.M. Alexander & J.R. Morgan (Eds.), International Navigation: Rocks
and Shoals Ahead? 167–170 (1988). However, the prohibitions to transit for supertankers
through the Malacca Straits, although repeatedly threatened, have never been put into
practice (Cataldi, supra note 53, at 107).
69. D.R. Rothwell, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in the Asia Pacific Following Entry
into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 624
(1994–1995) (hereinafter ‘Navigational Rights’); D.R. Rothwell, The Indonesian Straits
Incident. Transit or Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage?, 14 Marine Policy 492–494 (1990).
The United States claimed that
[n]o nation may, consistent with international law, prohibit passage of foreign vessels
or aircraft or act in a manner that interferes with straits transit or archipelagic sea lanes
passage
(83 AJIL 559–561 (1989)).
70. B.B. Jia, The Regime of Straits in International Law, at 181 (1998).
71. Id., at 194.
Malacca and Singapore Straits because of the strong protests of the coastal
states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) and changed its course towards
Australia and New Zealand, while the transit of the Pacific Pintail through
the Canal de la Mona was prohibited by Puerto Rico and the Dominican
Republic (1995).72 It is also worth remembering that, in January 1994,
Turkey adopted the Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits
and the Marmara Region, Article 30(1) of which provides that “nuclear-
powered vessels or vessels carrying nuclear cargo or waste […] must
obtain permission, in accordance with the relevant regulations from the
Undersecretariate for Maritime Affairs at the planning stage of the
passage.”73 After obtaining the authorization and before entering the
Straits, masters, owners or agents of the vessels carrying dangerous cargos
and which are 500 gross tons must notify all relevant information about
the passage (e.g., tonnage, flag, cargo, ports of departure and arrival,
whether a pilot is requested, deficiencies).74 The Regulations, which do
not seem to be consistent with Articles 1 and 2 of the 1936 Montreux
Convention,75 have been strongly criticized by the states that have been
using the Straits, such as the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Ukraine,
Cyprus and Greece.76 Trying to reach a compromise, IMO adopted the
Rules and Recommendations on navigation through the Strait of Istanbul,
Marmara Sea and the Strait of Canakkale, which “strongly advise” (but
not require) vessels intending to pass through the Straits to give prior infor-
mation on whether they carry any hazardous and noxious cargo and which
do not submit the transit to any authorization at all.77 As a result, in 1998,
Turkey partly amended the 1994 Regulations, maintaining, for vessels
carrying nuclear or other dangerous materials, only the duty to notify the
type of cargo and eliminating the duty to obtain prior permission to transit
through the Straits.78
4. THE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS
Generally speaking, the archipelagic waters are submitted to the same
régime as the territorial sea, i.e., the suspendible right of innocent passage
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73. See the text of the Regulations in 27 Law of the Sea Bulletin 62 et seq. (1995).
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(2001).
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for foreign vessels.79 Nuclear-powered vessels and ships carrying nuclear
substances may thus be required to pass through specific sea lanes and
must carry documents and observe the precautionary measures established
by international agreements.80 Nonetheless, the archipelagic state can
designate, together with the competent international organization,81 sea
lanes and air routes there above, suitable for the continuous and expedi-
tious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipel-
agic waters and the adjacent territorial sea: such sea lanes are submitted
to a régime (the “archipelagic sea lanes passage”) which is essentially iden-
tical to the transit passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion.82 Like transit passage, the archipelagic sea lanes passage cannot be
suspended (Article 54, in fact, refers to Article 44) and submarines must
navigate on surface and show the flag. All ships and aircraft enjoy the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage, meaning that no distinctions can
be made according to the nature of the vessel or its cargo.83 Furthermore,
no provision in the Convention requires to take into account the special
characteristics of the ships when designating the sea lanes.
Bearing in mind these considerations, the problem of the passage of
nuclear ships is easy to solve. In the archipelagic waters submitted to the
innocent passage régime, one should apply the same conclusions reached
with regard to the territorial sea: the most recent practice shows a trend
to consider non-innocent the passage of ships carrying nuclear material
and to submit it to the prior consent of the coastal state.84 This inference
is even more suitable (with the exception of the designated sea lanes) for
the archipelagic waters, which are often marked by shoals, rocks and coral
reefs: navigation is far more dangerous and the risk of accidents higher
than in the territorial sea. The economy of a small developing archipel-
agic state may entirely depend on fishing and tourism and the passage of
a ship carrying nuclear substances could be easily qualified as prejudicial
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According to Kwiatkowska, however, the archipelagic sea lanes passage and the transit
through international straits are very different régimes and their supposed similarity is
the consequence of an erroneous interpretation of the Montego Bay Convention (B.
Kwiatkowska, The Archipelagic Regime in the Practice of the Philippines and Indonesia
– Making or Breaking International Law?, 6 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal
Law 25–26 (1991)).
83. Art. 53(2). But see H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law 161–162
(1990), who believes that this topic remains a source of controversy.
84. See supra Section 2.
to its peace, good order or security.85 Many states, in fact, have expressed
their concern and Indonesia, the Philippines and Fiji, whose coasts were
lapped by the Pacific Pintail, did not give their consent to the vessel to
enter their waters.
As to the sea lanes designated by the archipelagic state, it has to be
applied the archipelagic sea lanes passage régime, which is equivalent to
the transit through international straits. In this case also, the interest of
the maritime powers in freedom of navigation through important water-
ways prevailed over the territorial claims of the coastal states. Travel
between and through these groups of islands (e.g., Indonesia), in fact, could
be the only practicable route to reach certain destinations: a detour around
the archipelago may necessitate an enormous deviation from the normal
voyage.86 It is worth noting that, even if it protested against the passage
of the Japanese plutonium shipments through its archipelagic waters,
Indonesia declared that it could not prevent them from transiting through
the sea lanes.87 The archipelagic state could only prescribe traffic separa-
tion schemes for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels and
adopt laws and regulations relating to archipelagic sea lanes passage, just
as it happens for straits.88
5. CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, according to the letter of the Montego Bay Convention, ships
carrying nuclear materials enjoy the right of innocent passage as any other
vessel, notwithstanding the particular nature of their cargo. However, the
claim of some coastal states to require the previous notification of the
passage seems to be consistent with the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
because it does not jeopardize the right of passage and enables the coastal
state to face potential accidents. Besides, the recent practice shows a clear
trend towards a more restrictive concept of “innocence” and a broader
notion of “security,” which could eventually lead to submit the passage
of this kind of ships through the territorial sea to the previous authoriza-
tion of the coastal state. The same conclusion applies, mutatis mutandis,
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[t]he nature of archipelagic waters and the ecological fragility of smaller archipelagic
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ronment require something more than the jurisdiction of a coastal state in territorial
waters with respect to innocent passage
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87. Malaysia Reports Concerns over Plutonium Shipment, Kyodo News Service, 16 October
1992.
88. Arts. 53(6) and 54 of the Montego Bay Convention.
to the archipelagic waters, with the exception of the archipelagic sea lanes
designated by the archipelagic state: here, as in straits used for interna-
tional navigation, the ius communicationis is still more important than
the right of the coastal state to protect its security and its environment,
and the rights of archipelagic sea lanes passage and of transit passage
cannot be denied to any vessels, even if they are carrying highly dangerous
substances.
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